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Abstract—Consider impersonation attack by an active mali-
cious nano node (Eve) on a diffusion based molecular commu-
nication (DbMC) system—Eve transmits during the idle slots to
deceive the nano receiver (Bob) that she is indeed the legitimate
nano transmitter (Alice). To this end, this work exploits the 3-
dimensional (3D) channel impulse response (CIR) with L taps
as device fingerprint for authentication of the nano transmitter
during each slot. Specifically, Bob utilizes the Alice’s CIR as
ground truth to construct a binary hypothesis test to systemat-
ically accept/reject the data received in each slot. Simulation
results highlight the great challenge posed by impersonation
attack–i.e., it is not possible to simultaneously minimize the two
error probabilities. In other words, one needs to tolerate on one
error type in order to minimize the other error type.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a diffusion based molecular communication (DbMC)
system, communication (transport of molecules from nano
transmitter to nano receiver) takes place through a diffusion
paradigm. Thus, the DbMC channel is a broadcast channel
which implies that the DbMC channel is prone to various
kinds of active and passive attacks by the adversaries in the
nearby vicinity [1]. Though there have been proposals to
secure the DbMC systems via cryptographic protocols [1], we
are of the opinion that physical layer security, being light-
weighted, also makes a strong case for DbMC systems. In this
work, inspired by the channel impulse response (CIR) based
authentication [2] in traditional wireless networks, we propose
to exploit the 3-dimensional (3D) CIR as device fingerprint
for authentication of nano transmitter in a DbMC system. In a
related earlier work, the co-authors studied the authentication
problem for an on-body, nano network operating in terahertz
band [3].
II. SYSTEM MODEL & CHANNEL MODEL
A. System Model
We consider a scenario whereby a legitimate nano transmit-
ter (Alice) talks to a legitimate nano receiver (Bob), while an
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active malicious node (Eve) is present nearby (see Fig. 1). We
assume that the DbMC channel is time-slotted. We further
assume that nano transmitters use pulse-based modulation
(i.e., on/off keying) whereby Alice (Eve) releases QA (QE)
molecules during each slot. We consider impersonation attack
whereby Eve pretends to be Alice in order to inject malicious
data into Bob’s system while staying undetected. In other
words, Eve is a clever impersonator which does spectrum
sensing in order to transmit in those slots when Alice is
idle. Finally, to deceive Bob, Eve releases the same kind of
molecules as Alice.
Fig. 1. System model: Eve emits same kind of molecules as Alice, but Eve
transmits during time-slots not utilized by Alice in order to stay undetected.
The molecules emitted by Alice (Eve) are shown in green (red).
B. The DbMC Channel Model
Let cB(d, t) represent the molecule concentration at Bob
(which is at distance dAB from Alice at time t):
cB(dAB , t) = QA(4piDt) 32 e− d2AB4Dt (1)
where D is the diffusion coefficient of the fluid medium.
cB(d, t) is also known as the 3D CIR of the DbMC channel.
A typical DbMC CIR as seen by Bob is shown in Fig. 2.
III. THE PROPOSED METHOD
During k-th timeslot, either Alice, or, Eve will utilize the
DbMC channel (assuming that the Eve avoids collisions so
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Fig. 2. The received molecular pulse at Bob (for QA = 5 × 105).
as to stay undetected). We assume that Bob utilizes the
initial fraction of each time-slot to measure the CIR of the
channel occupant. Thus, Bob obtains a noisy measurement
z(k) ∈ RL×1 of the CIR h ∈ RL×1 during slot k as follows:
z(k) = h + v(k) (2)
where L = LA = LB is the number of (symbol-spaced) taps of
the DbMC CIR and v(k) ∈ RL×1 is the measurement noise.
Specifically, v(k) ∼ N (0,Σ) where Σ = σ2(SHS)−1 ∈ RL×L;
σ2 denotes the variance/power of the additive Gaussian noise
at Bob1.
With z available, Bob casts the authentication problem as
the following binary hypothesis testing problem:⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩H0 ∶ z = hAB + vH1 ∶ z = hEB + v (3)
Then, z∣H0 ∼ N (hAB,Σ) and z∣H1 ∼ N (hEB,Σ). If H0
(H1) is true, then the data received on the DbMC channel is
accepted (rejected) by Bob.
Next, assuming that Bob knows hAB (and that the DbMC
CIR is time-invariant), it applies the following test:
(z − hAB)HΣ−1(z − hAB) H1≷
H0
δ (4)
where δ is the comparison threshold, a design parameter
whose value is to be determined. This work follows Neyman-
Pearson procedure to systematically compute the threshold δ.
Specifically, δ is computed by pre-specifying maximum Type-
1 error (i.e., probability of false alarm, Pfa) that Bob can tol-
erate. Then, for a given Type-1 error, Neyman-Pearson method
guarantees to minimize the Type-2 error (i.e., probability of
missed detection, Pmd).
Let T represent the test statistic in Eq. (4); i.e., T =(z−hAB)HΣ−1(z−hAB). Then, T ∣H0 ∼ χ2(2L); i.e., T has
central Chi-squared distribution with 2L degrees of freedom,
under H0. Then, the probability of false alarm Pfa (i.e.,
incorrectly identifying Alice’s data as if it is from Eve) is:
Pfa = Pr(T > δ∣H0) = ∫ ∞
δ
pT ∣H0(x)dx (5)
1S is the matrix formed by the training symbols. See [4] for more details.
where pT ∣H0(x) is the probability density function of T ∣H0.
Thus, one can set Pfa to a desired value α in Eq. (5) and
solve for the threshold δ.
With Pfa = α, the performance of the hypothesis test in
Eq. (4) is solely characterized by the probability of missed
detection (success probability of Eve): Pmd = Pr(T < δ∣H1).
Since computing the distribution of T ∣H1 is quite involved, we
numerically compute the value of Pmd in simulation section.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We set QA = QE = 5 × 105. We consider DbMC CIR with
L = 4,8,12 taps. larger values of L imply a DbMC channel
with shorter time-slots, which in turn implies a DbMC channel
with more-pronounced inter symbol interference (ISI) effect.
Fig. 3 plots the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
for two different values of variance σ2 of the additive noise at
Bob. Fig. 3 signifies that it is not possible to simultaneously
minimize the two error probabilities Pfa and Pmd. In other
words, one needs to tolerate on one error type in order to
minimize the other error type.
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Fig. 3. The ROC curves for σ2 = 1 and σ2 = 3.
V. CONCLUSION
This preliminary work exploited the DbMC CIR as the
device fingerprint for authentication of the of nano transmitter
during each slot. The proposed method is well-suited to DbMC
systems because it is light-weighted (compared to crypto-
graphic techniques which are computationally intensive).
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